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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

M A U R I N E TAYLOR,

J

Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS

*
K E I T H O ' B R I E N , INC.,
Defendant-Besjiondent.

I
\ Case No.
/ 13969
V
I

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
K E I T H O ' B R I E N , INC.,

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
The respondent agrees with the explanation of the
nature of the case as provided by the appellant.
DISPOSITION OF T H E L O W E R COURT
The appellant's statement is essentially correct as
to the disposition of the lower court.
1
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N A T U R E O F R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
The respondent seeks to have the Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict granted by the lower Court
sustained in its entirety.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The first three paragraphs of the appellant's Statement of Facts are essentially correct and undisputed.
However, it should be noted that the entry way to the
respondent's store is level and covered by the building
overhang. (R. 183, 289). Additionally, the substance
which was found in the entry way was a black, gritty
substance. (R. 193). Thereafter, however, additional
facts should be included.
Mr. Beltz ,the manager of the respondent's store
in question, testified that the maintenance employees
were required to maintain and clean the area in question
every morning prior to the store opening between 8:30
and 9:30 a.m. (R. 208). There was no evidence produced by either party that the area was in fact swept
the morning of the accident or that it was not in fact
swept the morning of the accident. Mr. Beltz testified
that this was the normal program which was followed.
(R, 208).
Upon being advised of the appellant's complaint,
Mr. Beltz inspected the entry area of which the appellant complained. A t that time, the entrance was found
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to be dry, with no signs of any moisture or anything
slippery. The area was immediately swept and Mr.
Beltz collected and observed approximately one-half
(Y2) cup full of a gritty-type substance. (R. 209).
There was no evidence introduced into the trial
as to whether or not there had been a recent snowstorm
in the vicinity of the respondent's store.
Mrs. Hill, an employee of the respondent's store
in question, indicated that the substance resembled that
which is spread by the street department during snowstorms. (R. 193).
There was no evidence introduced at trial as to
when the substance was placed in the entry way of the
respondent's store, who placed the substance in the
entry way of the respondent's store nor how long the
substance had been in that area of the respondent's store
prior to the alleged incident.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER T H E LAW OF T H E STATE OF
U T A H , T H E L O W E R COURT W A S CORRECT
IN DETERMINING
THE
APPELLANT
F A I L E D TO M E E T H E R BURDEN O F
PROOF IN PRODUCING SUFFICIENT EVI-
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D E N C E TO E S T A B L I S H L I A B I L I T Y
THE PART OF T H E RESPONDENT.

ON

The appellant failed to meet her burden of proof
in providing or producing sufficient evidence to the
Court below to establish liability on the part of the respondent herein. Under the law of the State of Utah,
it is clear that in order to impose liability upon the store
owner and in favor of a business invitee, it must first
be shown that a dangerous condition in fact existed
upon the premises. The mere fact that the appellant
fell on the premises of the respondent does not establish
in any sense a prima facie case that a dangerous condition existed. The existence of a "dangerous condition" is a requisite element here which appellant has
failed to establish. The record is totally insufficient to
establish this most necessary element.
Even if a dangerous condition could be shown, it
must be also shown that the condition was caused by
an act attributable to the owner of the premises or that
the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the
existence of the condition and had a reasonable opportunity to remedy same, or that the condition had existed
for such a time that the owner reasonably could have
discovered and removed it. Koer v. May fair Markets,
19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566; Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel
Co., 3 Utah 2d, 364, 284 P.2d 477 (1955); Hampton
v. Rowley Builders Supply, 10 Utah 2d 169, 350 P.2d
151 (1960); Sears Roebuck $ Company, v. Barkdoll,
4
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8 Cir., 353 F.2d 101 (1965); Howard v. Auerbach
Company, 20 Utah 2d 355, 437 P.2d 895 (1968); Long
v. Smith Food Kings Store, No. 13252 Utah Sup. Ct.
(October 4,1973), 531 P.2d 360.
The plaintiff in Koer, Supra, had entered the market at approximately 11:30 a.m. and while shopping
in the store slipped on a grape which was on the defendant's floor. The evidence demonstrated that the
floor had been swept that morning at approximately
8:00 a.m., approximately three and one-half hours prior
to the plaintiff's fall. I t was further shown that the defendant's store manager had been called from his office
to the cashier's checkstand which required him to pass
by the place where the fall ocurred just a few minutes
before the incident. I t was not shown that he in fact
saw the grape there or whether in fact the grape was
there at the time he passed by the area. The Court
stated that:
I t cannot be disputed that a store owner is obligated to exercise ordinary care to keep the
premises reasonably safe for the protection of
those patronizing his store. The mere proof of
injury within a store, however, does not raise,
without more evidence, an inference that the defendant had control or any notice of the object
causing the injury within the store nor does it
presume that he was negligent. I t is common
knowledge that a store owner is not an insurer
of the safety of his customers, (emphasis added)
(See also De Weese v. J . C. Penney Co., 5
Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956)
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The Court held that in cases of this nature, in
order to find the defendant negligent, it must be shown
that the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of any hazardous condition and had a reasonable opportunity to remedy
that condition. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
was affirmed in favor of the defendant by this Court.
I n Howard v. Auerbach Company, Supra, this
Court affirmed the lower Court's Order of Summary
Judgment of No Cause of Action, holding that the
store patron could not recover where there was no indication as to who had put some oil on an escalator step
within the store upon which the patron allegedly slipped and fell. There was no indication that the oil had
been on the steps for such a time that the store people
reasonably could have discovered and removed it.
I n Long v. Smith Food Kings Store, Supra, the
plaintiff sued for injuries suffered when he slipped
and fell on a piece of pumpkin pie on the floor of the
defendant's store. I n that case, the Court affirmed the
granting of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that upon the undisputed facts the
plaintiff could show no basis for recovery. The plaintiff
and his wife were shopping in the store when he slipped
ad fell on a piece of pumpkin pie in an aisle seven to
ten feet away from the aisle where the sample pies were.
There was no evidence that any store employee, or in
fact that anyone else, saw anything of that nature on
6
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the floor prior to the accident nor was there any evidence to show that anyone else knew of the existence
of the condition, how it got there, or how long it had
been there. The Court held in Long, Supra, that the
supermarket was not liable for the injuries suffered
by the plaintiff in absence of evidence that any store
employee saw anything of that nature on the floor prior
to the accident or any evidence as to how the pie got
on the floor or how long it lay there prior to the
accident.
The Court is confronted in the case at bar with
exactly the same situation as is described in the above
cited cases. There was no evidence produced at the
trial of this matter that the respondent placed the substance in the entry way nor evidence that the respondent knew of its presence. The evidence is to the contrary. Further, there is no evidence as to who in fact
was responsible for placing the substance in the entry
way nor any evidence as to how long the substance
had been there.
There is, however, evidence that in the normal business practice of the respondent, this area was swept and
maintained on a daily basis just prior to the opening
of the store. This cleaning would have occurred approximately two to three hours prior to the plaintiff's
alleged accident. This span of time is almost identical
to the situation in Koer v. May fair Markets, Supra,
where this Court held that:
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We just cannot ignore the fact that the grape
was only seen after the fall occurred. From
these circumstances alone a j u r y would not be
justified in inferring that the grape had been
there for such a period of time that, had the defendant exercised reasonable care, it should have
known of its presence.
The appellant states in her brief at page 5, that,
"the cause of the fall in the case now before the Court
was a black substance that seemed to spread on the
vestibule. The fair inference is that the substance came
in the vestibule when road crews attended to the snow
and ice outside the entrance way and it was a condition
which was recognized by the defendant and ordinarily
guarded against." The record before this Court is totally devoid of evidence sufficient to base this assertion.
There was no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that
there was a snowstorm in progress at the time of the
incident nor that there was a snowstorm that had occurred immediately prior to the incident. To the contrary,
as set forth in the Statement of Facts, the evidence submitted by Mr. Beltz was that the entrance way was totally devoid of any moisture and that it was in fact dry.
There absolutely is no evidence in the record which
could be construed to indicate that the substance which
was found in the vestibule area was "spread" upon the
vestibule by employees of the respondent. And there
certainly is no evidence in the record before the Court
as to how the substance arrived in the area, when it
was deposited there, who put it there or that the respondent had any knowledge of its presence. Finally,
8
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and most importantly, there is no evidence which establishes the existence of a "dangerous condition." The law
of Utah is clear that the respondent is not an "insurer"
of the safety of its business invitees. The mere fact that
the appellant fell does not establish that a "dangerous
condition" existed. Nor does it establish that the appellant was negligent. Koer v. May fair Markets, supra.
The appellant goes on to cite the case of De Weese
V. J. C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 and
asserts that this case is factually more in point with
the case now before the Court than those above cited.
Quite the contrary is the case. The D e Weese case
dealt with the question of whether a terrazzo entry way,
when it became wet, was a dangerous condition in and
of itself. The record was clear in De Weese, that the
defendant knew of the slippery nature of terrazzo tile
when wet and that it kept rubber mats or some abrasive ready for use during inclement weather. Thus, in
De Weese, the defendant had notice of the condition
of which the plaintiff complained prior to the accident.
De Weese is therefore not factually in point with the
case now before the Court.
The appellant concludes in her brief that Mrs. Hill
the respondent's employee, agreed with the appellant
that the entrance way should be swept. From this
premise, the appellant leaps to the ultimate conclusion
that the existence of the substance in that area was not
unusual. This logic is nothing more than speculation
which is not supported by any evidence.
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CONCLUSION
The lower Court was correct in granting the Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The evidence presented by the appellant was clearly insufficient to establish liability upon the respondent. Under the cases cited
herein, it would be incorrect to allow the j u r y to speculate as to whether a dangerous condition existed, how
the substance arrived in the entrance area of the respondent's store, when it was put there and by whom,
or that it had been there for such a time that the respondent knew or should have known of its presence
and had adequate time within which to sweep the area
clean. The appellant has failed to establish liability by
a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict should be affirmed.
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